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CASE COMMENTS

unless the court liberally applied the sweeping language of Jones v.
Appalachian Electric Power Co., supra. The principles of the
collateral source rule have no application in cases involving breach
of contract, United Protective Workers of America v. Ford Motor
Co., 223 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1955), and seem to be limited to the
personal injury field.
Lee O'Hanlon Hill

Damages

-

Corporations

-

Corporate -Liability for

Exemplary Damages
In a wrongful death action against a corporate employer
whose servant allegedly operated a motor vehicle in a willful and
wanton manner resulting in death of P's decedent, the defense of
the employer was that punitive damages were not recoverable under
Indiana law because the allegations of the complaint, if proven,
constituted a statutory violation for which the alleged wrongdoer
was subject to criminal prosecution. Held, P's motion to strike
the defense is granted. Under Indiana law, the rule barring exemplary damages, where the acts complained of also constitute
an offense for which the wrongdoer could be criminally prosecuted,
cannot be successfully raised to protect a corporate employer, which
is itself not subject to any criminal prosecution for the acts of its
servants. Bingamen v. Gordon Baking Co., 186 F. Supp. 102 (N.D.
Ind. 1960).
It appears that the West Virginia court has refrained from
discussing the effect of criminal prosecution of the servant on the
corporation's liability for exemplary damages. It is to be noted,
however, that the West Virginia court has been presented with
factual situations wherein the servant could have been subjected
to criminal prosecution, but the issue was never raised. Pendleton
v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 82 W.Va. 270, 95 S.E. 941 (1918).
The general rule -is that a corporation may be held liable for
exemplary damages for the wrongful acts of its agents or employees.
19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1286 (1940). The courts seem to take
two views on the question. By the federal and majority view, a
corporation cannot be held for exemplary damages for the torts
of its employees or representatives unless (1) it can be shown that
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managerial executive agents have participated in some way, or unless (2) the act has been ratified. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §
110 (rev. ed. 1946). The managerial executive agents could have
participated in the wrong (a) by ordering the particular conduct
of the agent, (b) by -issuing general orders which would naturally
produce such wrongdoing, or (c) by wanton carelessness in selecting or retaining an unfit servant. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 80
(1935). It is seen at once that the majority rule limits very
sharply, as a practical matter, the recovery of exemplary damages
against corporate employers. McCORMICK, supra.
The minority rule is one of unrestrictive liability. All that is
required to impose liability on the corporation is for the employee
or agent to be guilty of a wanton or malicious wrong within the
scope of his employment. BALLANTINE, supra. Thus, the latter
view simply applies the rule of respondeat superior to exemplary
damages. McCoRMICK, supra.
The West Virginia court holdings on a corporation's liability
for exemplary damages are in accord with the federal and majority
view. In Downey v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 28 W.Va. 732 (1886),
wherein the issue was first presented to the court, the court stated:
"The better and more reasonable doctrine seems to be that the railway company is not to be held liable in exemplary damages for injuries caused by the negligence of its servants, unless it be shown
that the servant's act was willful, and was either authorized or
ratified by the company. Such authorization or ratification can be
evidenced either by an express order to do the act, or an express
approval of its commision, or by retention or promotion of the
negligent servant."

Ricketts v. Chesapeake & O.R.R., 33 W.Va. 433, 10 S.E. 801

(1890), expanded the liability doctrine set forth in the Downey
case, supra, by holding the company liable in punitive damages if
the servant's act was expressly or impliedly authorized or ratified
by the company. But, in Gillingham v. Ohio River R.R., 35 W.Va.
588, 14 S.E. 243 (1891), the court, in granting exemplary damages to a passenger who was falsely imprisoned by the conductor
in charge of the train, made no mention of the necessity of authorization or ratification. Similarly, Davis v. Chesapeake & O.R.R., 61
W.Va. 246, 56 S.E. 400 (1907), without mentioning authorization
or ratification, held that the company was liable for exemplary
damages, if the act of the servant is malicious, wanton, willful or
reckless. Then, in Hains v. Parkersburg, Marietta & Interurban
Ry., 75 W.Va. 613, 84 S.E. 923 (1915), the court said that corp-
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orations, other than public carriers, would not be liable for exemplary
damages, unless the act was authorized or ratified. Thus, the court
has placed a general rule of liability for exemplary damages in
actions against public carriers, and a special rule of liability for
other corporations. In the Hains case, supra, the plaintiff was a
pedestrian who was struck and injured by the defendant's conductor
when the latter threw a heavy tool from the train onto the pavement. The court said that it was essential to show authorization
or ratification of the conductor's wrongful act in order to fix liability on the railway company for exemplary damages, since the
plaintiff was not suing as a passenger. Thus, even though the carrier is said to be subject to a general rule of liability for exemplary
damages, the plaintiff must bring himself within a definite classi.e., a passenger-before recovery of exemplary damages will be
permitted by the West Virginia Supreme Court.
A recent federal case in this state on corporate liability for
punitive damages is Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Lethcoe,
279 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1960). There it was held that, under
West Virginia law, the showing of retention by the store manager,
who committed the wrongful acts in question, in the employment
of the corporate defendant, was insufficient evidence to establish
authorization or ratification by defendant. Plaintiff was denied
punitive damages. See Comment, 63 W. VA. L. REv. 196 (1961).
In Pullman Co. v. Hall, 46 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1931), plaintiff,
a passenger, brought an action against the carrier for an alleged
assault committed on the plaintiff by the carrier's employee. The
court held that there must be either authorization or ratification by
the carrier to justify the recovery of punitive damages. It appears
that, on the facts of this case, the plaintiff would have been able
to recover from the carrier, if this action had been pursued in the
state court. Since the plaintiff was a passenger, suing a public
carrier, his recovery of exemplary damages would not depend upon
an authorization or ratification by the carrier.
Although the West Virginia court generally follows the federal
rule on corporate liability for exemplary damages, it quite logically
has adopted the exception with regard to public carriers. The
protection of the traveling public requires that carriers should be
held liable for the acts of their servants, to whom they have entrusted the performance of their contracts of carriage.
Nick George Zegrea
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